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Land Reform and Land Markets in Colombia:  
Impacts on Equity and Efficiency 
 
Abstract:  Based on a large survey to compare the effectiveness of land markets and land reform 
in Colombia, we find that rental and sales markets were more effective in transferring land to poor 
but productive producers than was administrative land reform. The fact that land transactions were 
all of a short-term nature and that little land was transferred from very large to small land owners 
or the landless suggests that there may be scope for policies both to improve the functioning of 
land markets and to facilitate greater land access by the most disadvantaged. Analysis of the 
factors associated with success in a sample of land transfers from large to small producers helps to 
identify key elements for policies in both respects.  
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1. Introduction  
In many developing countries, a highly unequal distribution of land makes it more difficult to sustainably 
reduce poverty. One reason for this is that lack of land access in the context of an unequal distribution of 
land can create obstacles that may prevent the poor from accessing credit markets to make discrete 
investments, e.g. in schooling or to take advantage of other economic opportunities (Aghion et al. 1999). 
The literature has long emphasized that in a world where credit markets are imperfect, a highly unequal 
distribution of assets and economic opportunities will reduce both household ability to invest and social 
cohesion, and thus, ultimately, economic growth (Deininger and Olinto 2000). The dependence of 
landless households on the continued goodwill of landlords to provide them with land for their sustenance 
rather than ownership reduces their shadow wage, thus reducing the cost of hired labor, but also reducing 
the incentives for the landless to acquire human capital (Binswanger et al. 1995, Conning 2002). This will 
also reduce the scope for establishing independent institutions, with potentially far-reaching and adverse 
consequences for economic and social development (Nugent and Robinson 2002). Finally, an unequal 
distribution of land ownership, together with lack of efficient land markets that could help bring land to 
its most appropriate use, will often lead to significant inefficiency in utilization of land and under-
investment.  
This is at the root of the seeming paradox that in many countries with highly unequal land distribution, 
lack of land access and environmentally unsustainable cultivation of marginal areas by the poor often 
goes hand in hand with underutilization of large tracts of productive land. Aspects of this problem have 
been illustrated for Colombia (Heath and Binswanger 1996), Brazil (World Bank 2003b), Zimbabwe and 
Southern Africa (Moyo et al. 2000), and the Philippines (Putzel 1992). There is consensus that dealing   2
with the legacy of unequal access to land and economic opportunities may not only be highly desirable 
from a social equity perspective, but can also be a boost to economic growth and greater efficiency 
(Deininger 2003).  
As much of the inequality in the land ownership distribution has its origin in non-market interventions, 
policy-makers have often assumed that markets will not be able to help correct, and may even reinforce or 
worsen, pre-existing inequalities in land access or ownership. Instead, it was believed that government 
intervention would be needed to deal with the legacy of a highly skewed land ownership distribution.  
Three insights suggest that there may be a need to rethink this position. First, even though there are some 
notable exceptions, such as in the case of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, most government-sponsored land 
redistributions have failed to meet the associated expectations. This suggests that, at least in some 
situations, the implications of “government failure” may be as undesirable as those arising from the 
market failures such intervention was supposed to overcome.  
Second, it is now realized that households access land through a variety of mechanisms. Because rental 
and sales markets will be affected very differently by the market imperfections common in many rural 
areas, a more differentiated judgment will be needed. Also, that the complementarities between different 
types of land access may be much larger than initially presumed. In fact, recent evidence from a number 
of countries suggests that rental markets transfer land to the poor and more productive (Sadoulet et al. 
2001, Deininger and Mpuga 2002, Deininger and Jin 2002, Rozelle and Swinnen 2003). While this may 
be less the case with land sales markets that tend to be more affected by imperfections in financial 
markets than those for rental, markets are part of the reality of rural areas. Better understanding of the 
advantages and disadvantages of markets in any given situation, with the aim of complementing them 
where needed, is likely to be more promising than trying to pursue a strategy of wholesale substitution 
(Tejo 2003).  
Third, there is evidence that, even in situations where land was successfully redistributed, constraints on 
the functioning of markets may limit beneficiaries’ ability to realize the full gains from such reforms by 
transferring their use (Rawal 2001) or ownership rights (Kawagoe 1999). In fact, elimination of 
restrictions on the ability of land reform beneficiaries to engage in land transactions does have significant 
economic benefits.  
While all of these arguments suggest that researchers recognize the importance of different avenues to 
access land (de Janvry et al. 2001), empirical evidence that compares different mechanisms to access land 
is still scant. More detailed empirical analysis is necessary if the awareness on multiple access options to   3
land is to be transformed into specific policy advice. In this paper, we use the example of Colombia to 
explore this issue empirically.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two provides the background and conceptual framework by 
describing salient characteristics of land relations in Colombia, drawing on the literature to develop 
testable hypotheses concerning the performance of land sales, rentals, and land reform, and describing the 
data and estimation strategy to be used. Section three provides descriptive statistics and reports the results 
from econometric analysis to test these hypotheses. Section four links the results to the broader policy 
context by assessing aggregate changes in land concentration, reviewing attributes associated with 
success in a sample of land transfers from large to small or landless producers, and discussing 
implications for policies to increase land access. Section five concludes with a number of policy 
recommendations.  
2. Background and conceptual framework  
To provide the necessary factual and conceptual background, this section briefly discusses the evolution 
of land policy in Colombia as well as the literature regarding the advantages and disadvantages of 
different types of land markets. We use this to introduce the data to be used and the empirical strategy to 
be employed.  
2.1 Land markets and land reform in Colombia  
Colombia, like other Latin American countries, is characterized by a highly dualistic distribution of land 
ownership, the roots of which can be traced back to colonial land grants (encomiendas). The high level of 
inequality has been maintained by policy-related factors including (i) tax incentives for agriculture that 
caused rich individuals to acquire land to offset taxes on nonagricultural enterprises, (ii) credit and 
interest rate subsidies plus disproportionate protection of the livestock sub-sector that provided incentives 
for agricultural cultivation with very low labor intensity, and (iii) the use of land to launder money that 
had been acquired by drug lords. Most of these interventions worked disproportionately in favor of large 
farmers (Heath and Binswanger 1996). By raising land prices significantly above the net present value of 
profits from agricultural production, they made it nearly impossible for productive small farmers to 
acquire land through the land sales market (Carter and Mesbah 1993). Land rental was impeded by tenure 
insecurity and ill-conceived laws that outlawed share tenancy in an attempt to improve the welfare of 
tenants but instead were conducive to eviction of tenants and increased cattle ranching (Jaramillo 1998). 
All of this restricted the options for the poor to gain access to land and often left state-sponsored land 
reform as virtually the only mechanism to facilitate land transfers to the poor.   4
Aggregate data illustrate the tendency toward increasing land concentration during the early 1990s. As 
table 1 illustrates, despite growing population pressure and the associated fragmentation, this period was 
characterized by land transfers from small and medium toward large farms. Adjusting for land quality, the 
number of “small” farm units (comprising less than two Unidades Agricolas Familiares [UAFs]
1) 
increased slightly, from 89.9% to 91.1% of all farms, and the share of area cultivated by these shows a 
slight decrease, from 23.1% in 1984 to 21.4% in 1997. A more significant reduction in area, from 30.5% 
to 24.8% with almost constant share in the farm units, is observed for medium-sized farms. Large farms 
increased their share of area from 46.3% to 53.8%. The lower panel illustrates that this conclusion is even 
more pronounced if physical area is taken as the basis for the assessment. This situation has increased the 
propensity of violence in rural areas creating insecurity and reducing the incentive to invest (Machado 
1999, Mondragon 1999).  
The data also support the close link between land concentration and inefficient land use whereby a 
significant amount of arable land is left unused while marginal areas that are often ill-suited for such 
exploitation are dedicated to extensive livestock ranching (Grusczynski and Jaramillo 2002). The extent 
of mis-allocation of resources this implies is illustrated in table 2 which compares actual with potential 
land use in Colombia in 1999. Out of a total area of 114.2 million hectares, about 12% is suitable for 
agriculture. In 1999, only 30% of this land was actually devoted to crop production, pointing to severe 
underutilization. At the same time, there was over-exploitation of land for pasture. Although only 17% of 
the total land is suitable; more than double this amount is actually used for pasture.  
The negative economic and social consequences of such unequal land access have been known for a long 
time: in fact a 1950 World Bank mission identified unequal land distribution as a key impediment to 
economic and social development in the country (Currie 1950).
2 While various policies have been 
adopted to deal with this, their success was limited by a combination of an inappropriate policy 
environment, limited financial resources, cumbersome processes loaded with bureaucratic obstacles, and 
the impact of drug money and violence on the rural economy. The national land reform institute 
(INCORA), which was established in 1961, found it easier and politically more expedient to colonize the 
frontier than to redistribute land in the country’s interior, and the impact of the government’s land reform 
effort is judged to have been very limited. More than a quarter century of land reform has done little to 
bring about substantive change in either land ownership or operational distribution of land (Machado 
1999).  
                                                 
1 The UAF is the area of land which, for given agroecological conditions, can generate income for a family.  Because the UAF is defined at the 
level of municipalities and natural regions within these, it provides a better way of accounting for the potentially vast differences in land quality 
that are difficult to integrate into the analysis if only physical farm size is considered.   5
Starting in the 1990s, and following earlier steps to eliminate a number of restrictions on the functioning 
of land rental markets, Colombia embarked on a series of macro-economic and sectoral policy reforms 
that significantly opened up the rural economy (Jaramillo 2001). The elimination of policy interventions 
in the early 1990s was combined with a new land reform law, passed in 1994, that aimed to establish a 
more integrated process with a greater role for beneficiary initiative (Deininger 1999). Spending on land 
reform increased significantly; as illustrated in table 3, the amount of resources spent by INCORA alone 
increased from about 8% of the Ministry’s central budget in the 1980s to 13% in 1997 (FAO 2000). 
Together with loans by the then Caja Agraria that were largely devoted to land reform beneficiaries, 
many of whom were unable to pay them back, resources spent directly or indirectly on land reform 
accounted for 35% of the central or about 20% of the total agricultural budget.  
The goal of these policy measures was the reduction of incentives for speculative land acquisition and the 
elimination of the advantages that were traditionally enjoyed by large land owners and cattle ranchers. 
Such reforms would make it easier for market forces to work, thereby opening up alternative forms of 
land access for poor but efficient producers. Given the large magnitude of the resources involved, 
assessment of the extent to which, after the reforms, markets helped to bring about a redistribution of 
land, and how their results compare with those obtained by the government’s program will be of great 
interest for policy.  
2.2 Comparing different modalities of land transfer  
The literature suggests that, because they are generally associated with low transaction costs and because 
possible working capital constraints on the part of the tenant can generally be overcome through sharing 
arrangements, rental markets provide a flexible way of transferring use rights among producers, thereby 
improving productivity of land use. The ability to transfer ownership in land sales markets provides the 
advantage of enabling the owner to use land as collateral in credit markets, in addition to possible greater 
investment incentives, but comes at the cost that the outcome from land sales is more likely to be affected 
by imperfections in the functioning of financial markets.  
To compare the performance of land rental and sales markets with land reform, let household i be 
endowed with fixed amounts of labor ( i L ) and land ( i A ), and a given level of agricultural ability ( i α ). 
Households can allocate their labor endowment between farming their own land and off-farm 
employment at an exogenous wage ( i w ). Renting or selling of land incurs transaction costs (T) 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 “…the cattle fatten on the plains while the people often have to struggle for a bare existence in the hills. … As a result, they exploit the land 
very severely, adding to erosion and other problems, and even so are not able to make a decent living. This pattern of land use is one of the most 
important causes of low labor productivity in agriculture and of resulting widespread poverty in rural areas” (Currie 1950:63).   6
proportional to the amount of land transferred, and we assume that working capital is not binding. With 
this, household i will choose l
a*, l
o*as well as A* by solving the maximization problem: 
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* will solve the first-order conditions (FOC) of problem (P) (see Deininger and Jin (2002) 
for detailed derivation of the FOC). Under these assumption, solving the maximization problem by 
household i and developing first-order conditions allows us to derive propositions about the functioning 
of land rental markets that can then be tested empirically.  
Rental markets: It can be shown that the amount of land rented in will be strictly increasing in ability, α, 
and be strictly decreasing in land endowment, A  (Deininger et al. 2003). Rental markets will thus transfer 
land from less productive to “poor but efficient” producers, as a direct consequence of the negative 
relationship between farm size and productivity as often asserted in the literature (Carter 1984, 
Binswanger et al. 1995, Benjamin 1995). While the welfare impact of such a transfer would depend on 
how the gains from the contract will be distributed among the parties, we expect that rental will lead 
toward an equalization of the distribution of operational land holdings irrespective of the land ownership 
structure. Higher transaction costs will drive a wedge between what is received by those renting out and 
what is being paid by those renting out, thereby decreasing the number of transactions. Presence of off-
farm opportunities has the opposite effect; producers with low ability will take on off-farm jobs and rent 
out to those with higher levels of ability, thereby increasing aggregate production. This will be associated 
with a decrease in the equilibrium rental rate and, unless there is high risk of job loss in the off-farm 
sector, will make everybody better off.  
Sales markets: Expanding the above model to accommodate land sales in the presence of stochastic 
income is analytically complex and the literature has generally resorted to simulation to obtain solutions 
(Zeldes 1989, Deaton 1991, Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993). One key result from such simulation is that 
the speed at which markets will be able to shift land to poor but efficient producers will depend on the 
level of credit market imperfections and the frequency and magnitude of exogenous shocks. The 
parameter values encountered in most empirical situations imply that the scale and speed of redistribution 
through markets will be well below the socially desirable level (Carter and Zimmerman 2000). Given the 
higher transaction costs, the amount of transactions will always be much less than in rental markets.   7
Moreover, in an environment characterized by capital market imperfections, the scope for acquiring land 
through the sales markets will depend more on asset endowments than on ability.  
Land reform: Imperfections in capital markets make it difficult for the poor to acquire land despite their 
inherent productivity advantage and such market imperfections may lead to the permeation over time of 
inefficient structures of asset ownership (Zimmerman and Carter 2003). Direct transfers of land to 
landless and small producers or targeted support that would enable them to acquire land through other 
means would, under certain conditions, help to break out of such an inefficient equilibrium toward one 
characterized by higher levels of growth and social welfare (Bardhan 2000). While the need to remedy 
market imperfections can provide a justification for such intervention, selection of the most able 
beneficiaries is often not easy, given that ability is not easily observed by outsiders (Deininger and Jin 
2002). Replacing impersonal market forces with discretionary bureaucratic action can also introduce 
distortions of its own, especially if it is difficult to write incentive compatible contracts and if supervision 
costs are high. In such circumstances,  these may compromise the potential impact of a land reform policy 
and imply that other mechanisms to improve land access by the poor would be appropriate.  
2.3 Data sources and estimation strategy  
To assess the performance of land markets in Colombia, we use panel data on about 1,270 farm units 
from a two-round survey undertaken by the Colombian government in collaboration with IICA and the 
World Bank.
3 Data were collected from 55 clusters in Colombia’s 11 main agro-ecological regions in 
1997 and 1999. To obtain maximum variation of farm sizes, large operations, drawn from lists of sugar, 
banana, coffee, and oil palm enterprises in the selected clusters, were oversampled. A multi-purpose 
survey instrument was used to obtain detailed information on agricultural production, land market 
participation, and tenure status. In the roughly 1,000 cases of household-based enterprises, the household 
associated with the production unit was canvassed using a standard household questionnaire. To account 
for differences between arable, permanent, pasture, and fallow land, we convert land into equivalent units 
by multiplying the different classes.
4  
To empirically estimate the relationships between participation in land rental and sales markets or land 
reform, ability, land endowments, household and community characteristics as outlined above, we need 
an estimate of the ability αij of farm i in village j. To do so, we use a Cobb-Douglas production function:  
3 2 1 ) exp(
θ θ θ α α ijt ijt ijt j i ijt K L A Q + =        (1) 
                                                 
3 The surveys are being referred to as the primera and segunda encuesta de calidad de vida y eficiencia de los productores agricolas (PECVE and 
SECVE). The basic unit of observation was the farm or UPA (Unidad de Producion Agraria) although a module on household characteristics was 
administered to all farms where such a household could be identified. 
4 The factors used are 2 for perennials, 0.5 for pasture, 0.3 for forest, and 0.1 for other non-productive land.    8
where Qijt is agricultural output produced by household i in village j in year t; Aijt, Lijt and Kijt are land, 
labor and capital inputs used, θ1, θ2, and θ3 are technical coefficients to be estimated, and exp(αi+αj), is the 
efficiency parameter of interest. Taking logs of both sides, adding a time trend T and an iid error term, we 
obtain an estimable equation for production by household as follows.
5  
log (Qjit) = αij + λ1 log(Ajit) + λ2 log(Ljit) + λ3 log(Kjit) + λ4T + εjit   (2) 
where αij =αj + αi is the composite efficiency parameter, composed of a household-level idiosyncratic 
element (αi) and a village-level effect (αj) which reflects access to infrastructure and markets, soil quality, 
climate, etc. Agricultural land markets are location-specific with little scope for trading across municipios 
or departamentos, implying that the parameter of interest for land market participation is αi, i.e. each 
producer’s ability relative to the village mean. Availability of multiple observations per household in the 
panel allows us to obtain this parameter in a two-step procedure where we first run a panel regression to 
recover αij and, after subsequent application of the same procedure at the regional level that helps to 
recover αj, we obtain the variable of interest, αi, by simple subtraction.  
To capture determinants of land rental market participation, we estimate an equation of the form  
Ri = β0 + β1α + β2Xi + β3Zi  + єit    ( 3 a )  
where Ri is a dummy that equals one if the household is renting in or out and zero otherwise and the 
parameter αi is the household’s level of agricultural ability constructed as explained above. The vector Xi 
contains household characteristics, in particular household size and composition, and the head’s age and 
education, households’ endowment with land and other agricultural and non-agricultural assets in value 
terms, and a dummy indicating whether or not a household member participated in non-farm employment. 
Finally, Zi denotes community characteristics, including the share of producers, excluding the producer 
under concern
6, participating in credit or rental markets in the municipality, which are taken to reflect 
municipio-specific levels of transaction costs in land and credit markets. 
From the discussion of rental markets, we expect that β1>0, in the rent-in and β1<0 in the rent-out 
equation, i.e. producers with higher ability will rent in while those with low ability will rent out. The fact 
that we expect land rental markets transfer land from large owners to small producers who will be able to 
make more productive use of this asset implies that the element of β2 corresponding to the amount of land 
owned be positive in the rent-out and negative in the rent-in equation. If markets for other factors, 
                                                 
5 To estimate the Cobb Douglas production function we take logarithm of both sides of the equation, avoiding the problem of zeros, by including 
a dummy variable for positive values of each input, something that has been demonstrated to yield unbiased estimates (Battese 1997). 
6 Let the number of producers in any given cluster be given by N, the number of those participating in rental (or credit) markets by M (or C), and 
let m or c be a dummy variable that equals 1 if the producer under concern participates in rental (or credit) markets and 0 otherwise. Then the 
variable included in the regression is defined as (M-m)/(N-1) or correspondingly (C-c)/(N-1).    9
especially capital, are functioning well, households’ composition and their ownership of other assets 
should not have a significant impact on decisions regarding production and participation in rental or sales 
markets. Finding a significant coefficient on capital would therefore point toward imperfections in 
markets for working capital that make it impossible to use, for example, a future harvest as collateral to 
finance production inputs. Similarly, if labor markets function well, household size and composition 
should not affect rental market participation. Finding significance of the respective element of β2 (positive 
for renting in or negative for renting out) would therefore point to labor market imperfections whereby it 
is easier for households to use family labor in agricultural production than to obtain wage employment. In 
line with proposition 3 we expect the element of β2 corresponding to non-farm employment to be negative 
at the household level.  
Finally, we use the level of rental activity in a given village as explained above to proxy for transaction 
costs in these markets. The justification for doing so is that for any producer the marginal costs associated 
with participation in land markets, e.g. inquiring about prices and supply, negotiating the terms of 
transfer, and enforcing contracts will decrease with the village-wide level of market activity. A similarly 
constructed variable on the share of producers having access to formal credit is used as a proxy for credit 
supply and is introduced to assess whether availability of infrastructure at the local level has an impact on 
land market outcomes. Other unobserved community-level characteristics such as access to infrastructure 
and markets, are represented by regional dummies.  
For participation in the sales market, we estimate a similar equation  
Si = β0 + β1α + β2Xi + β3Zi  + єit    (3b) 
with Si denoting participation in land sales or purchase markets. Definitions of most right hand side 
variables are as above with the exception that Xi now includes variables for initial endowments wherever 
available and the transaction cost element in Zi is approximated by the level of sales market activity 
excluding the producer under concern. The key difference between sales and rental markets is that 
imperfections in credit, other policy distortions, and non-economic factors that affect the perceived value 
of land will have a more profound impact on the outcomes observed in the latter. If the ability to 
overcome imperfections in markets for credit and insurance is more important than the ability to make 
productive use of the land, β1 in (3b) may no longer be positive for purchases. Similarly, if land is held 
for speculation and other non-productive purposes even though doing so is not economically rational, the 
coefficient on ability will no longer be negative in the sales equation and education which will increase 
the ability to make productive use of land may no longer be as relevant. The same rationale, in addition to 
the ability to overcome capital market imperfections, would imply that land may no longer be acquired by   10
those with lower initial land ownership or sold by those with large endowments, and that initial access to 
assets (or off-farm income streams) may have an overriding impact on purchase or sales decisions.  
Finally, to assess how the government’s land reform program compares to the performance of 
decentralized markets, we specify equation (3c) where the dependent variable, Bi denotes a dummy that 
equals 1 if the biggest part of a household’s land was received through INCORA and 0 otherwise.  
Bi = β0 + β1α + β2Xi + β3Zi  + єit    ( 3 c )  
Rather than helping to draw inferences on the performance of decentralized markets as before, the 
coefficients in this equation will provide insights on the extent to which government intervention has been 
targeted toward poor but relatively productive producers, i.e. those with high agricultural ability (β1), low 
initial endowments of land and non-land assets, and possibly low levels of education. Even though a 
rigorous assessment of the productivity impact of land reform would require a comparison of the 
productivity of the same plot of land before and after being subjected to land reform, the ability to target 
reform toward more productive producers would obviously make it more likely to have a positive 
productivity impact. The ability to provide land access to poor producers who presumably would not be 
able to access land through other means provides a key justification for such an intervention and finding 
that it has not been well targeted would provide a strong argument to review either the justification for or 
the specific mechanisms used in such an intervention.  
 
3. Empirical evidence  
Implementing the above framework, we find that land rental indeed provides considerable opportunities 
to the productive poor for accessing land. This impact is less pronounced for land sales if the extent of 
area transferred is considered, as predicted. Most surprisingly, land reform failed to improve equity and 
efficiency, leading to the question of whether markets alone might be sufficient to address Colombia’s 
land access issues.  
3.1 Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive statistics, separately for all enterprises and the household sample, are given in table 4 for sub-
groups defined by the nature of their land market and land reform program participation. The top row 
demonstrates that about 14% of enterprises in the sample rented in, 4% rented out, and 11% (or slightly 
above 2% per year) had, over the 5-year period from 1994 to 1999, engaged in land purchases, and about 
6% had sold land. The fact that 10% of sample households had benefited from the land reform program 
illustrates the importance of government-sponsored land market intervention compared to the operation of   11
free markets. While it is not surprising to find significant differences in median endowments of capital in 
the form of livestock and machinery which are about 75% higher for the whole sample as compared to 
households only, the fact that levels of output per hectare do not follow this trend is of interest. Heads of 
household are, with an average of 53 years, quite old, the mean level of education is almost 7 years of 
schooling, and 18 % of heads were female.  
Comparing household characteristics across the different groups suggests that land markets perform an 
important function of inter-generational transfer as evidenced by the fact that those who acquired land in 
the market, either through rental or sale, are significantly younger and, in the case of rental, also have 
larger households than the rest. Rental markets appear to contribute to equalization of the operational 
distribution of land; in fact for both groups the median tenant in the sample own no or hardly any land. 
Partial productivity, as approximated by both the gross value of output per hectare and this figure net of 
variable inputs excluding unpaid family labor, is significantly higher for those renting than for the rest of 
the sample. This relationship is less clear for land buyers where none of these differences is statistically 
significant. Concerning land reform beneficiaries, it is of interest to note that, even though total output is 
in line with that achieved by others, median land endowments for reform beneficiaries are quite large, 
suggesting that this group may not make the most effective use of the resources at their disposal, a 
hypothesis that is supported by a relatively low level of output per hectare.  
3.2 Land market participation  
Results of estimating equations (3a) and (3b), with a zero/one indicator for participation in land rental and 
sales markets, and a dummy for having benefited from land reform, are illustrated in table 5
7. In line with 
the conceptual discussion, we are interested in the impact of agricultural ability as well as initial land 
holding to ascertain the productivity- and equity-impact of land sales and rental markets, respectively, 
compared to redistributive land reform
8. Results for participation (probit) suggest that land rental but not 
sales markets increase the access to land by producers who are more productive and who own less land. 
Government land reform has failed on both counts; the highly significant and positive coefficient on 
beneficiaries’ pre-participation land endowment implies that reform efforts were not well targeted to the 
poor whereas the negative coefficient on their ability suggests that, at least compared to the average land 
holding, government-sponsored land redistribution did not lead to productivity gains. At the same time, 
tobit models for the area exchanged in land rental and sales markets (table 6) indicate that productive 
efficiency does not facilitate access to greater areas of land and that, even though land rental markets have 
                                                 
7 As the survey did not ask for the amount of area that was transferred under land reform, we can only estimate a probit model for land reform 
participation.  
8 We discuss first the rental and then the sales and land reform equations. Given that tobit estimates led to very similar results, we limit our 
discussion to results from the probit regressions.   12
a significant element of redistribution to producers with low land endowments, purchase markets do not 
facilitate greater access to land by those with small endowments. This implies that detailed consideration 
of the extent to which land markets, especially those for sales and purchase, transfer land across farm size 
strata, and of ways in which public policy can help to make such an outcome more likely, will be needed.  
Rental markets: Results for rental market participation are illustrated in columns 1 and 2 of table 5, with 
all coefficients reported as marginal probabilities. Agricultural ability is indeed highly significant for 
those who rent in, but not for those who rent out land. As predicted, land rental has a strong redistributive 
impact as indicated by the negative sign of the coefficient on land ownership in the rent-in and the 
positive one in the rent out equation. The fact that households’ endowment with agricultural assets and 
consumer goods increase their propensity to rent in points toward the presence of working capital 
constraints. Rental markets provide land access to the young and relatively uneducated; higher levels of 
education reduce the propensity to rent in up to a level of about 7 years of completed schooling after 
which the propensity to rent in increases again. Large households are more likely to rent in land while 
female-headed ones are less likely to do so, pointing to labor market imperfections that make it easier to 
use labor in home production. Finally, the high level of significance and the large size of the coefficient 
on the share of producers practicing in land rental in the village suggest that the level of rental market 
activity varies considerably across localities. One interpretation of this is that factors associated with 
perceived security of tenure, the ease with which information on rental can be obtained and contracts be 
enforced, continue to constitute an impediment to the unrestricted functioning of rental markets.  
The coefficients for renting out are in many ways a mirror image of what had been obtained for renting in. 
In line with what was found earlier, characteristics of the local economy appear as a key determinant of 
renting-out decisions; the share of households in the village who have members participating in the off-
farm economy is highly positive and significant, as is the level of land rental in the village. In addition, 
the propensity to rent out increases up to a level of about 4.5 years of education, large owners are more 
likely to rent out while female headed households are slightly less likely to do so.  
Concerning the magnitude of the coefficients obtained, we note that the scope for renting in decreases 
rapidly with higher land ownership. To illustrate, a household with 2 ha of land will be 14 percentage 
points less likely than one that does not own land. Similarly, a male headed household with 7 members 
and a head aged 30 is 8% more likely to rent in land than one headed by a 50-year old female with only 2 
members. Increasing the share of renters in the village by 10 points is predicted to increase everybody’s 
propensity to rent in by 2 points. Slightly smaller orders of magnitude are found for renting out.  
Compared to these relatively large effects, the impact of agricultural ability, while significant, remains 
minor; noting that the difference between the 10
th and the 90
th percentile in terms of ability is only about   13
3.5 percentage points, one notes that shifting a producer from the lower end to the top of the ability 
distribution would increase her propensity to rent in by less than 2 percentage points. We interpret this as 
an indication that, even though land rental markets have started to work in the right direction, even for 
rental markets ability alone will often not be sufficient to overcome constraints on their participation 
posed by imperfections in other markets as well as other location-specific impediments (e.g. violence and 
drug money) to the smooth operation of such markets. Mechanisms that would ensure that ability 
translates more effectively into demand could therefore be useful.  
Sales markets: Results for sales and purchase markets as illustrated in columns 3 and 4 of table 5 lead to 
two surprising conclusions. First, the negative and significant coefficient on ability for those who sold 
land suggests that at least some inefficient producers are starting to get rid of some of their land. This is in 
line with the descriptive evidence which pointed to lack of profitability and the need to repay debts as a 
key reason for participation in land sales markets and suggests that broader policies are starting to have an 
impact on observed outcomes in markets. Second, households with lower land endowments were more 
likely to have acquired land while larger land owners were more likely to have sold land. This suggests 
that, contrary to what one might have expected in view of continuing concerns about land re-
concentration, land sales markets have, in the sample considered here, performed a redistributive role.
9 In 
fact, comparing the size of the coefficients on land owned for buying/renting in and selling/renting out, 
respectively, suggests that it is easier for those without land to acquire land through the rental market 
whereas those with high land endowments would prefer selling to renting. We also note that, compared to 
rental, the intergenerational dimension is more pronounced in the land sales markets as the propensity to 
buy land decreases rapidly with age while the tendency to sell land increases with age, though at a slower 
rate. At the same time, the impact of education is almost identical in magnitude for buying and renting in, 
though less significant for renting out.  
Turning to the magnitude of the coefficients, one notes that a key factor prompting households to 
purchase land is their non-agricultural wealth; increasing the value of households’ endowment with 
consumer goods from the 10
th to the 90
th percentile of the distribution would increase the propensity to 
buy land by about 6.5% points. On the other hand, the two most important factors leading households to 
sell land are the level of initial land ownership and their access to non-farm income. A one ha increase in 
land ownership increases the propensity to sell by about 3% points, similar to the increase observed 
through access to non-farm income. Taking these factors together, one notes that lack of profitability, 
together with large land sizes, does lead producers to sell off land although it is not a major determinant. 
                                                 
9 This does not mean that in locations not covered by our sample, especially those characterized by high levels of violence and/or continuing 
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At the same time, capital constraints appear to be more important in sales than in rental markets, thus 
precluding efficient producers from acquiring land through this channel.  
Land reform: To compare the result of the government-sponsored land reform process with those 
obtained through the operation of markets, we estimate equation (3c) for beneficiaries of land reform. 
Doing so yields a number of rather surprising findings. First, we find that the coefficient on the original 
land endowment is positive and highly significant at the 1% level. This, together with the lack of 
significance of the coefficients on other agricultural and consumer assets, suggests that the government’s 
land reform efforts failed to target the land poor, something that would be consistent with the hypothesis 
of a land reform process that is relatively centralized and not well attuned to local conditions and needs.  
A second surprising finding relates to the negative coefficient on agricultural ability (significant at the 
10% level) which suggests that land reform beneficiaries are on average less productive than the rest of 
rural producers. To explore whether this is only a temporary effect, we interacted the farmer’s ability with 
the time when the land was acquired (not reported). The fact that the coefficient of this variable is not 
significant leads us to conclude that land reform beneficiaries’ level of ability failed to improve over time. 
In addition to these findings, the regression for reform beneficiaries also suggests that households who 
benefited from land reform are larger than the average, they have slightly lower education (significant at 
10%) and, despite having been awarded areas that are much larger than those owned by the median 
farmer, more likely to engage in off-farm activities. This is consistent with the descriptive statistics on 
relatively low partial productivity per unit land area presented earlier (table 4). In addition to suggesting 
that the model followed in earlier reforms was in line neither with goals of poverty reduction nor 
productivity enhancement, this implies that remaining restrictions on the ability of land reform 
beneficiaries to transfer their land might constitute an important impediment to increased productivity on 
these lands which would ultimately also translate into higher levels of welfare for their owners.  
Comparing these results with those emerging from tobit regressions with the area transferred as the 
dependent variable (table 6) broadly reinforces the picture painted earlier: In fact, all the variables except 
the (initial) land endowment and the level of agricultural ability are almost identical in significance and 
relative magnitude to the ones estimated in the probit. Concerning the latter, it appears that, both for 
renting in and for purchasing land, access to assets is a critical precondition and that, even though more 
able and land-poor producers may have a greater propensity to rent in land, wealth constraints may 
outweigh their productivity advantage and preclude them from purchasing land. Although unproductive 
large farmers are more likely to sell, the land freed up through such sales is unlikely to be transferred to 
small producers, thereby limiting the impact such sales will have on the distribution of land ownership.  
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4. Implications for policy 
Survey statistics and evidence on continuing land concentration due to non-market mechanisms especially 
involuntary displacement, outside the sample areas support the notion that, even though better functioning 
of land markets is an indispensable first step toward improving access to land by the poor, additional 
measures will be required to help make a significant impact on the land ownership distribution. Although 
not sufficient to establish causality, review of transfers of land from large to small producers points 
toward a number of characteristics that were regularly associated with success and that may therefore 
constitute important elements in any program that aims to increase poor but productive producers’ access 
to land over and above what is currently accomplished through markets and thus make a contribution to 
equalize the land ownership distribution. We use this evidence to discuss how some of these elements 
could be integrated with ongoing efforts to strengthen the role of local governments in overall territorial 
planning.  
4.1 Land market operation and changes in land concentration  
Descriptive evidence from the survey confirms that the lion’s share of land transactions occurs within the 
same farm size stratum. Concerning changes in the land ownership distribution, the top panel of table 7 
provides evidence for segmentation of markets in the sense that the majority of sales by small producers 
are concluded with other smallholders (87%) while 50% of large farmers sell to large farmers or 
enterprises, consistent with earlier studies that found that, despite considerable activity in land markets, 
few sales or purchases had been concluded across farm size strata (FAO 1994). One notes that almost two 
thirds of land sales (62%) are undertaken by small producers with a farm size below 15 ha. The main 
reason prompting those who sold land in the 1994-99 period to do so was to pay debts (47%) followed by 
“other”, a category that includes violence and local security (23%), the need to generate liquidity for 
purchase of consumer goods (16%), lack of profitability and the desire to buy land elsewhere (about 7% 
each). Lack of profitability and the need to pay debts together are slightly more prevalent among large 
producers (64%) compared to medium (57%) and small ones (50%), as is the selling of land for security 
reasons (28% compared to 14% for medium and 24% for small farms). Evidence on land buyers 
displayed in the bottom panel of table 6 provides additional support to the hypothesis that high transaction 
costs limit the extent of land sales across farm size groups. One notes that almost all of the land purchased 
by small farmers (94%) originated from other smallholders rather than from large farmers. Large buyers 
obtained the land bought about equally from small and large producers (46% each). While further 
evidence would be useful, it appears that there is still considerable scope to improve the functioning of 
land markets, both by increasing tenure security and by helping to reduce transactions costs especially for 
transactions across farm size strata.    16
Concerning the operational distribution of land, the bottom panel of table 7 illustrates that the biggest 
share of land rental is accounted for by tenants who own less than 15 ha of land (89% of the total). The 
mean area rented in by this group is, with 3 hectares, fairly large, although there are some large land 
owners rent in significant areas bring the average up to 6 ha. One notes that, while large producers rely 
entirely on cash rent, 44% of small tenants use sharecropping arrangements, something that would be 
consistent with the presence of credit constraints or a desire to reduce risk (Otsuka et al. 1992). For 
households renting out (top panel of table 7), the main reason for supplying land to the rental market 
seems to be related to age or disability rather than to economic factors, in line with descriptive evidence 
on the importance of intergenerational transfers. We also note that “other” reasons for renting out are 
reported by less than 10% of sample households. The size of area rented out, 1.6 ha overall (but only 0.2 
ha in the group of small producers with a land endowment between 0 and 15 ha) is surprisingly small 
compared to what is reported for renting in. One possible explanation for this, as well as the low share of 
producers who report that economic incentives prompt them to rent out land, can be that those who rented 
out all of their land will, by design, not appear in the sample.  
A second issue of concern is that, in addition to the limited impact of markets in redistributing land due to 
intra-stratum sales, the outcomes obtained through markets may be more than outweighed by changes in 
land ownership and access that are not mediated by markets, largely in the context of involuntary 
displacement of small producers.
10 As these phenomena tend to occur in areas that are geographically 
distinct from those where markets operate, traditional surveys may not be a good source of information on 
either the extent or the magnitude of this phenomenon. New evidence, however, illustrates not only the 
large size of this problem but also its close link to land issues. A key reason for the latter is the fact that, 
because territorial control is a key element in the war strategies of guerrillas and paramilitary forces, 
expulsion of land users becomes a tactical element in the armed struggle, with far-reaching consequences 
for household welfare and livelihood opportunities.  
This is supported by the fact that, in a large survey that covered most of the country’s territory, more than 
60% of IDPs indicated that they used land before being displaced, a share that is much larger than the 
percentage of land owners in the overall population (World Bank 2003a) and econometric evidence for a 
smaller sample (Kirchhoff and Ibanez 2001). In fact, displacement may be driving what is often described 
as an agrarian counter-reform of massive proportions. Estimates put the aggregate amount of land 
abandoned by internally displaced people in recent years at 4 million hectares (Global IDP Project 2003), 
almost three times more than has been redistributed at high cost during more than three decades of land 
reform. In addition to the impact on the level of land concentration, such massive displacement will also 
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affect the productivity of land use and the welfare of those concerned. Productivity will suffer because the 
land abandoned by IDPs is unlikely to be effectively utilized by their successors. Because their 
agricultural skills are normally of little use in the urban or peri-urban areas to which they are driven, the 
welfare of those displaced who previously made their living from agriculture is likely to be more severely 
affected than that of other groups who suffer from displacement.  
4.2 Characteristics of successful land transactions transcending farm size barriers 
The two key results from our analysis, namely that markets make a modest, though limited, contribution 
to improving land access by the productive poor but that land accumulation, especially in the context of 
involuntary displacement, can easily outweigh the results of market forces, imply a two-fold challenge for 
policy. On the one hand, it will be necessary to create an environment where productivity-related factors 
and market forces rather than speculation, violence, and power, will affect outcomes. On the other hand, 
there may be scope for addressing some of the constraints and shortcomings that have made it difficult for 
markets to provide greater land access in a way that does not, as was the case with many “old style” land 
reforms, try to substitute for markets but rather complement them in areas where they might otherwise 
fail.
11  
To illustrate this, we review characteristics that were systematically associated with success
12, measured 
either as an increase in the productivity of the farm or of beneficiaries’ income compared to the pre-
transfer situation, or by the fact that after the transfer beneficiary households are able to obtain an 
absolute income of at least two minimum salaries of a random sample of beneficiaries in 32 projects that 
had transferred land from large to small producers (Suarez and Vinha 2003). Table 8 presents results for 
the total sample and each of the subgroups mentioned. Of the 111 households interviewed, 59 (53%) 
increased productivity compared to the pre-transfer situation and 64 (57%) were associated with an 
increase in beneficiaries’ income. At the same time, only 32 households (24%) obtained an income of 
more than two minimum salaries-still short of the goal of three minimum salaries enunciated in the land 
reform legislation, which was achieved by only 13% of those in the sample.  
Project characteristics: Compared to those that are based on private sector participation and initiative, 
projects sponsored by the government land reform agency were significantly less likely to have been 
successful. As the first line of Table 8 illustrates, only 28% of the projects that achieved an increase in 
                                                 
11 Due largely to shortcomings in implementation, even the land reforms conducted in Colombia under Law 160 had, in practice, more similarities 
with “old style” top down land reforms rather than a more decentralized approach that builds on initiative by beneficiaries and empowers them 
rather than bureaucrats (Rojas 2001).  
12 The definition of a project as “successful” implies that a given project (a) transfers to small and medium-sized producers property rights for 
large properties that are appropriate for agricultural use but are not or not fully utilized; (b) allows new users to make more productive use of the 
land, thereby increasing the intensity of land use; (c) improves their standard of living; (d) does so in a way that the costs and benefits of the 
transfer (including complementary investments) allows for a program that is fiscally sustainable and can be scaled up in response to need; and (e)   18
productivity and 22% of those that achieved more than two minimum salaries were INCORA projects, 
compared to 50% and 46%, respectively, of those that did not. The exact opposite is true for market-based 
transfers, which make up 72% of those where beneficiaries receive more than two minimum salaries and 
58% of those with a productivity increase. One of the reasons for the limited success of INCORA projects 
appears to be that, in quite a number of cases, the institution was forced to undertake certain transactions 
due to political pressure or violence. Transactions motivated by violence were significantly less 
successful in increasing income (comprising only 18% of those that managed to improve income 
compared to 23% of those that did not), pointing toward the importance of the broader economic and 
market environment to facilitate success of interventions to reduce land concentration. A third variable 
that distinguishes successful from unsuccessful projects is beneficiary participation. In a much higher 
share of projects where productivity or income increased or where an income above two minimum 
salaries was achieved, beneficiaries participated in selecting the organization of production and, (in the 
latter case) the purchase price of the farm.  
Access to capital and other markets: A second set of factors that seems critical for success is the ability to 
access capital as well as output markets, in line with anecdotal evidence suggesting that the success of 
many land reform projects who, being focused only on transfer of land, have been caught in a liquidity 
trap with few opportunities for economic advancement. Lack of access to any working capital is a key 
determinant of failure in all dimensions whereas projects that had access to working capital of different 
sizes and to bank credit were significantly more successful than those who had not. The importance of 
liquidity on the input side is matched by the relevance of access to market information and transport on 
the output side.  
Household attributes: Although higher levels of education are significantly associated with the ability to 
increase income above a minimum level, they are less relevant for the ability to increase either income or 
productivity. To the contrary, whether or not beneficiaries live on the farm appears to be a key condition 
for increased income as well as productivity. 
4.3 Implications for programs to overcome land concentration  
The above discussion illustrates that, to facilitate land transfers from large to small farmers, it will be 
critical to provide economic incentives that would increase the cost of holding land speculatively and, for 
households threatened by involuntary displacement, increase tenure security.
13 If the policy environment 
is adequate, sales and rental markets can help transfer land to poor and productive producers but, in order 
                                                                                                                                                             
do not reduce the overall mobility of land. Also note that the measure of income used here, i.e. 2 minimum salaries, is still short of the goal of 
three minimum salaries enunciated in current land reform legislation.     19
to make an impact on the land ownership distribution, additional support to economically viable projects 
that aim to bring highly underutilized land into more intensive production may be needed and could yield 
significant benefits
14. Successful projects to accomplish this were associated with active participation and 
interest by beneficiaries and access to capital and output markets. A concerted effort, building on 
initiatives at the national and local levels seems to have considerable potential in this respect.  
At the local level, it will be necessary to establish a policy framework (including land taxation) that 
encourages operation of land (rental and sales) markets based on private sector initiative and, if additional 
support is to be provided, to systematically identify land use potential, compare it to present utilization, 
and identify complementary infrastructure and other investments that may help to bring underutilized land 
into productive use. Rather than intervening in an ad hoc manner that might upset local processes, 
national institutions should focus on providing incentive-compatible policy guidelines, monitoring land 
market trends across localities and, where needed, technical and financial support in a way that would 
build on the existing infrastructure at the local and departmental levels. Even though many of them have a 
strong environmental or urban bias, land use plans (planes de ordenamiento territorial or POT) which 
have to be put together by all local governments provide a basis on which further efforts in this regard can 
be built (Zapata and Arismendy). 
5. Conclusion and policy implications  
This paper compares the performance of decentralized land markets that are based on private initiative to 
that of land reform that is sponsored by the central government. We find that, quite surprisingly, land 
markets make a significant contribution to greater equalization of the operational structure of land 
holdings and, to a more limited extent, the ownership structure. The rather disappointing performance of 
land reforms suggests that one can not take it for granted that government reforms will be more effective 
in addressing this issue. This implies that significant advances for more efficient land utilization and 
greater access to land by the poor can be made by strengthening the framework to ensure that titles are 
secure, information is freely available, there is access to financial instruments, and long-term contracts 
can be entered into.  
At the same time, our results show that markets alone are unlikely to be able to deal with the deep-rooted 
problems of unequal land access and the associated inefficient utilization of this factor of production in 
Colombia. The main reasons are threefold, namely (i) for markets to function, minimum levels of physical 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Being characterized by significant pressure for speculative land accumulation and concentration, a limited productive infrastructure, and the 
threat of involuntary displacement, locations where the government has implemented land reform in the past may be the most difficult for land 
reform 
14 Surprisingly, case study interviews suggest that even large landlords understand that, in order to preserve social peace and reduce the scope for 
violence, negotiated solutions that provide greater land access for the productive poor will be needed. Apparently they would also be willing to   20
security and rule of the law are required; (ii) economic incentives such as a realistic level of land taxation 
to bring land to its most productive use instead of engaging in speculative land accumulation need to be in 
place; and (iii) even where the above conditions hold, financing constraints are likely to limit the ability 
of the poorest groups in society to take advantage of the opportunities offered.  
Instead of trying to substitute for well-functioning markets, government policy should thus aim to create 
the conditions in which markets can operate to the best of their capacity and, once this has been achieved, 
to provide specific assistance to help the poor overcome the shortcomings and finance constraints 
impeding their ability to access land even with well-functioning markets. Re-orienting land reform policy 
along these lines would constitute a departure from the centralized model followed thus far. Instead it 
would provide assistance to complement efforts by local governments who have already demonstrated 
their concern about broad land access and effective land use to ensure that such efforts will not only 
improve productivity but do so in a way that provides maximum benefits to the poor.  
                                                                                                                                                             
make some contributions (including provision of land) to such a process as long as they have a possibility of affecting the selection of 
beneficiaries and, jointly with these, managing the production process (Suarez and Vinha 2003).    21
Table 1. Structure of Landownership and Use in Colombia, 1984 and 1997 
  By Productive Capacity 
 Area  Units 
  1984 1997 1984 1997 
Small (0–2 UAF)  23.15  21.40  89.92  91.11 
Medium (2–10 UAF)  30.50  24.80  8.68  7.81 
Large (> 10 UAF)  46.35  53.80  1.40  1.08 
  By Extension 
  Area Units 
  1984 1997 1984 1997 
< 100 hectares  40.00  34.50  96.90  97.40 
100–500 hectares  27.50  20.50  2.70  2.30 
>500 hectares  32.50  45.00  0.40  0.30 
Sources: Top panel from Machado (1999); bottom panel from Mondragon (1999). 
 
 
Table 2. Actual and Potential Land Use in Colombia, 1985 and 1999 
  Potential (1985)  Actual Use (1987)  Actual Use (1999) 










Agri. crops (annual or perm.)  14.0 12.6  5.3 4.64  36.8 4.4 3.9  30.6 
Pasture    19.2  16.8  40.1  35.1  209  41.2  36  215 
Forest 78.3  68.6  58.9  51.6 75.2  65.4  57 83.5 
Nonagricultural & urban       8.5  7.44         
Urban and water   2.3  2.01 1.4  1.23 60.9  3.2  2.8 139 
Total 114.2  100  114.2  100    114.2  100   
Source: Anuario Estadístico del Ministerio de Agricultura, 1999. 
 
Table 3: Public spending for land reform and related projects, Colombia different years (Bn. 2000 Pesos) 
  1985 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total INCORA  3.12 88.24  130.78  124.26  89.34  69.00 
  of which technical assistance  19.4% 11.4%  3.0%  3.5%  9.7%  18.6% 
  of  which  grants  0.0%  5.7%  52.1% 55.2% 60.3% 20.1% 
 of  which  infrastructure  41.6%  12.3% 4.7% 16.6% 1.6%  1.1% 
  of which titling and cadastre (RA)  29.9% 56.4% 31.1% 16.2% 16.5% 25.7% 
Caja Agraria (credit & vivienda)  4.95  32.10 237.27  197.29 81.59 132.61 
INCORA + Caja Agraria  8.07  120.34 368.04 321.55 170.93 201.62 
Total Central Spending  40.28 707.12  1039.15  931.23  891.42  791.32 
Spending by municipalities  0.00 435.12  593.29  764.69  967.61  1253.71 
Total Min. of Agriculture   40.28  1142.24 1632.44 1695.91 1859.03 2045.03 
INCORA of central  7.8%  12.5%  12.6%  13.3%  10.0%  8.7% 
INCORA  of  total  7.8% 7.7% 8.0% 7.3% 4.8% 3.4% 
INCORA + Caja of central  20.0% 17.0% 35.4% 34.5% 19.2% 25.5% 
INCORA + Caja of total  20.0%  10.5%  22.5%  19.0%  9.2%  9.9% 
Source: Food and Agricultural Organization (2000). 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for total and household samples  
 Total  sample 
  Total  Not renting Renting in Renting out Selling  Buying  Reform benef.
No. of enterprises   1275  81.96%  13.96% 4.24%  5.80%  10.59% 8.55% 
Land cultivated 1999 (mean)  29.12 31.21  8.62  55.97 56.62  24.66  15.09 
Land cultivated 1999 (median)  3.91 4.14  2.59  7.00 5.85  4.75  8.37 
Land owned 1997 (median)  3.15 4.01  0.00  8.97 5.03  3.76  9.70 
Land owned 1999 (median)  3.15 4.10  0.00  6.70 5.10  4.51  7.95 
Mean livestock assets (US $)  6984  7797  1468  9228  12132  8216  4018 
Mean machinery assets (US $)  849  848  471  2095  3003  898  297 
Total value of output 99 (median) 1212.41 1212.98  1089.41  2252.70 1572.21  1733.71  1200.46 
Value of output per ha 99 (median) 326.70  295.64  509.72  290.84  281.89  359.47  166.92 
  Household sample 
  Total  Not renting Renting in Renting out Selling  Buying  Reform benef.
No. of households   1011  83.68%  12.66%  3.86%  6.33%  10.19%  10.09% 
Household size  4.62  4.56  4.95 4.82  4.78  4.55 5.51 
Head's age  53.39  53.94  49.48  53.97  56.73  44.46  51.93 
Head's education  5.67  5.67 5.49 6.26  6.48  6.17 5.35 
Female headed  18.20% 18.91%  10.16% 28.21%  14.06%  8.74% 15.69% 
No of persons <=14 years  1.38 1.33  1.72  1.51 1.08  1.49  1.94 
No of  persons 14-55 years  2.45  2.41  2.66  2.69  2.69  2.55  2.87 
No of  persons >55 years  0.79  0.83  0.57  0.62  1.02  0.51  0.70 
Mean level of education  6.55 6.54  6.49  6.86 7.15  6.76  6.42 
Land cultivated 1999 (mean)  14.47 15.84  5.68  13.77 23.43  11.24  13.89 
Land cultivated 1999 (median)  3.63 3.77  2.87  5.20 4.81  4.92  8.28 
Land owned 1997  2.75  3.48  0.01 8.29  4.29  4.12 9.76 
Land owned 1997 (median)  2.75 3.48  0.01  8.29 4.29  4.12  9.76 
Mean livestock assets (US $)  4021  4530  1112  2428  4553  3924  4045 
Mean machinery assets (US $)  509  500  619  343  1064  275  266 
Total value of output 99 (median) 1168.79 1161.73  1166.00  1849.46 1151.54  1742.77  1210.99 
Value of output per ha 99 (median) 337.39  310.86  452.79  370.34  291.38  369.47  165.47 
Source: Own computation from the PECVE and SECVE.  
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Table 5: Probit regression for participation in land sales and rental markets or receipt of land through land reform 
  Rental market (last year)  Sales market (last 5 years)  INCORA 
  Renting in  Renting out  Sold land  Bought land  Received land 
Agric.  Ability  0.005**  -0.001 -0.008** -0.004  -0.007* 
  (1.96)  (0.64) (2.21) (0.69)  (1.70) 
Land owned (equiv ha)  -0.071*** 0.012***  0.034***  -0.019**  0.025*** 
  (9.24)  (2.69) (5.77) (2.23)  (3.59) 
Value of agr. assets (log)  0.007*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.001  0.002 
  (3.15)  (1.10) (1.10) (0.33)  (0.79) 
Value of consumer   0.006**  0.000  0.001  0.011***  -0.004 
   Goods (log)  (2.46)  (0.06)  (0.55)  (3.27)  (1.41) 
Has non-farm income  -0.018  0.012 0.033** -0.014 0.024 
  (1.54)  (1.34) (2.17) (0.76)  (1.50) 
Village level non-farm inc. -0.019  0.072***  -0.010  -0.009  0.057 
  (0.54)  (2.62) (0.25) (0.18)  (1.21) 
Head's  education  -0.014*** 0.009**  0.003  -0.013* 0.005 
  (3.00)  (2.29) (0.47) (1.85)  (0.81) 
Head's education squared  0.001*** -0.001**  0.000  0.001* -0.001 
  (2.63)  (2.02) (0.12) (1.74)  (1.52) 
Head's age  -0.001***  0.000  0.001**  -0.004***  -0.001 
  (2.94)  (0.49) (2.22) (5.74)  (1.20) 
Female headed  -0.025**  0.023* -0.019 -0.041*  -0.006 
  (2.09)  (1.96) (1.18) (1.91)  (0.31) 
Household size  0.007***  0.000  -0.000  -0.005  0.011*** 
  (2.78)  (0.21) (0.03) (1.26)  (3.67) 
Credit access in village   0.007  0.050  -0.006  0.085   
  (0.14)  (1.32) (0.09) (1.17)   
Rental in village  0.220***  0.060**  0.096  0.151*   
  (6.81)  (2.44) (0.98) (1.66)   
No of observations  1009  1009  1009  1009  1009 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.39  0.16 0.14 0.14  0.17 
Log likelihood  -235.87  -138.86 -204.46 -286.64  -272.61 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Regional dummies included but not reported separately.  
1 The variable for land owned and assets refer to 1999 for renters, and to 1994 for the rest.  
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Table 6: Tobit regression for area transferred in land sales and rental markets  
  Rental markets (last year)  Sales markets (last 5 years) 
  Area rented in  Area rented out  Area sold   Area bought  
Land owned (equiv ha)  -12.250***  15.855***  27.439***  -1.467 
  (7.71) (2.67) (5.27) (0.62) 
Agric. ability   -0.173  -6.498  -16.672**  -1.800 
  (0.12) (1.16) (2.57) (0.64) 
Agricultural assets (log)  1.693***  -3.698  -5.053**  -0.173 
  (3.68) (1.55) (2.08) (0.19) 
Consumer goods (log)  0.952**  -0.611  -1.787  2.932*** 
  (2.12) (0.28) (0.77) (3.11) 
Has non-farm income  -2.001  13.377  34.510**  -0.597 
  (0.83) (1.10) (2.46) (0.11) 
Village level non-farm inc.  1.189  86.938**  5.476  -9.082 
  (0.18) (2.40) (0.15) (0.61) 
Head’s Education  -2.657***  10.727*  5.522  -4.606** 
  (2.77) (1.89) (0.96) (2.23) 
Head’s education squared  0.178***  -0.556  -0.053  0.292** 
  (2.81) (1.50) (0.15) (2.18) 
Head's age  -0.215**  0.265  1.028**  -1.149*** 
  (2.54) (0.66) (2.21) (5.62) 
Female headed  -8.956**  21.258*  -22.856  -8.994 
  (2.54) (1.68) (1.24) (1.23) 
Household size  0.848*  1.746  0.146  -1.282 
  (1.78) (0.76) (0.06) (1.15) 
Constant -8.712  -221.078***  -251.234***  23.082 
  (1.09) (4.40) (4.97) (1.30) 
Observations  881 881 881 881 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.12 0.07 0.08 0.06 
Log likelihood  -604.90  -293.60 -434.95 -651.47 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Regional dummies included but not reported separately.  
1 The variable for land owned and assets refer to 1999 for renters, and to 1994 for the rest.  
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Table 7: Details on performance of land rental and sales markets 
 
SALES MARKETS 
  Land sellers 
Land size class (ha)  Total  0-15  15-50  >50 
Sold land last 5 years  74  62%  19%  19% 
Area sold (ha)   3.3  0.2  1.5  29.0 
Land sold to(percentages)      
Small  farmer  75.7 87.0 85.7 28.6 
Big farmer  8.1  2.2    35.7 
Enterprise 5.4  2.2  7.1  14.3 
Other & not reported  10.8  8.7  7.1  21.4 
Reason for selling (percentages)      
Pay  debts  47.3 45.7 57.1 42.9 
Buy  consumption  goods  16.2 17.4 28.6  - 
Lack of profitability  6.8  4.3  -  21.4 
Buying land elsewhere  6.8  8.7  -  7.1 
Other reasons (incl. security) 23.0 23.9 14.3 28.6 
  Land buyers 
Land size class (ha)  Total  0-15  15-50  >50 
Boughtlandlast5years  135 73% 18% 10% 
Area bought (ha)   39.30  5.78  50.38  271.60 
Land bought from(percentages)       
Small  farmer  85.19 93.88 70.83 46.15 
Big  farmer  12.59 4.08 29.17  46.15 
Other & not reported  2.22  2.04  -  7.69 
 
RENTAL MARKETS 
  “Landlords” renting out 
Land size class (ha)  Total  0-15  15-50  >50 
Rented out in 1999 (Obs)  54  69%  13%  19% 
Area rented out   1.57  0.19  1.16  12.53 
Reason (percentages)      
Age  22.2 21.6 14.3 30.0 
Widowhood  or  disability  37.0 35.1 57.1 30.0 
Better  job  24.1 27.0 14.3 20.0 
Lack of credit  7.4  8.1  14.3  - 
Other 9.3  8.1  -  20.0 
  Tenants renting in  
Land size class (ha)  Total  0-15  15-50  >50 
Renting in 1999 (obs)  178  89%  8%  2% 
Area rented in (ha)   6.03  2.99  30.23  36.13 
Composition of rent paid         
     Sharecropping (non-cash)  37.97%  43.87%  -  - 
     Cash   62.03%  56.13%  100.00%  100.00% 
Source: Own computation from the PECVE and SECVE.  
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Table 8: Project- and household level factors contributing to land reform project performance 
  Total  Productivity Change   Income  Change   Absolute  Income   
  Sample  No Incr.  Increase   No Incr. Increase    <= 2 msal  > 2 msal  
Project Characteristics                 
INCORA  42.96  50  28.81  **  48.93 31.25  ** 45.57 21.88  ***
Market transfer  38.52  30.77  57.63  *** 34.04 53.13  ** 34.18 71.86  ***
Violence was an issue  25.19  23.08 18.64    36.17  9.38  ***  18.99  25   
Beneficiaries selected organ.  form   24.44  17.65 49.15  *** 19.57 45.31  ***  27.85 51.61  ***
Negotiation on price of farm  25.19  21.15 22.03    21.28 21.88    12.66 43.75  ***
Changes in use of technology  21.48  23.08  33.9    27.66 29.69    21.82 46.88  ***
Capital Market Access                 
Working capital zero  46.67  61.54  30.51 *** 57.45  35.94  **  51.9  28.13 ** 
Working capital > 0 but < 3 mn P  28.15  17.31 45.76  *** 21.28 40.63  ** 32.91 31.25   
Working capital more than 3 mn P  25.19  21.15 23.73    21.28 23.44    15.19 40.63  ***
UPA has access to bank credit  38.52  38.46 54.24  **  31.91 57.81  ***  40.51  62.5  ** 
Distance to market  56.69  54.21 48.4    64.13  41.46  ***  52.3 48.19   
UPA has access to transport  54.81  59.62 81.36  *** 61.7  78.13  ** 65.82 84.38  ** 
UPA access to technical assistance  55.56  65.38 79.66  **  65.96 48.13  *  70.89 78.13   
UPA access to market information  42.22  50  59.32    42.55  64.06  **  45.57  78.13  ***
Household Characteristics                  
Head has primary education  35.56  38.46 47.46    40.43 45.31    51.9  21.88  ***
Head has secondary education  28.15 30.77  38.9   27.65  40.63  * 27.84  53.13  ***
Head has professional education  13.33  21.16 11.86  * 16.15 14.06    12.66  25  ** 
Beneficiary displaced household  15.56  21.15  8.47  ** 34.04  0  *** 17.72  6.25  * 
Household lives on farm  51.11  42.31 67.79  *** 34.04 71.88  ***  55.7  56.25   
No. of observations  111  52  59     47  64     79  32    
Statistical significance of differences: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on land transfer survey (Suarz and Vinha, 2003). 
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